AGATA MACHCEWICZ-GRAD, Is habitus a habit? An analysis of the definition of habitus and its function in Aristotelian action theory

SUMMARY

The article consists of two main parts in which I analyze the Aristotelian notion of habitus. The first examines it as an ontological notion which was introduced by Aristotle mainly in Categories and Metaphysics. In the second part I investigate the function of that notion within Aristotle’s action theory (in Nicomachean Ethics). The central question which arises in the course of the analysis is whether we should identify actions consequent upon habitus (or virtues and defects which are special cases of habitus) with actions consequent upon habit. A negative answer stems from Aristotle’s action theory: actions consequent upon habitus are not by definition unconscious or irrational. This answer turns to be more evident when Aristotle’s theory of practical reasoning is taken into account. Despite this, accustoming plays a significant role in the process of acquiring a habitus according to Aristotle.